Q1 2021

The dizzying start to 2021 has made it more challenging to write a letter in which I hope to offer broader commentary on our strategy and outlook. Between the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, the Democrats’ historic Senate win in Georgia, Biden’s inauguration and the second impeachment of Donald J. Trump – all set against the backdrop of a global pandemic – this letter, like 2021, has seen many iterations in a short period of time. While I started drafting this letter in early January to augment the fund level reporting you have already received, it is only making its way to you now that enough time has passed to process the fits and starts characterizing the start of 2021 and the challenges of 2020.

I’m also cognizant that at this time last year, I rewrote an early draft of this letter when news of an outbreak of a mysterious virus in Wuhan, China surfaced. Little did anyone know at the time that a year later, this virus would have taken an unthinkable toll on human life across the globe and been met with wildly different responses country-by-country, all while wreaking havoc on the global economy. In last year’s letter, we gave some details on our monitoring of the situation and the contingencies we were beginning to consider. I find myself a year later even more cognizant of the extent of the unknowns we face.

While all of the events of 2021 have shocked people around the world, they have seemed to have little effect on our markets. What did get the market’s attention was a little known stock called GameStop. For the better part of 2020, this company with thin profit margins and a negative return on equity had a market capitalization near $300M. By the end of January, it still had no earnings but its market cap had grown to over $22B. The severe price action in GameStop captured the imagination of the broader public in a way we have not seen since the internet bubble of the late 1990s. GameStop is not, however, just another Pets.com. GameStop broke through because it is a metaphor for concerns about the fairness of markets, income inequality and broader social unrest. Ultimately, GameStop provided yet another wake-up call that these are issues we can no longer ignore.

These disparate events remind us of our core responsibilities as managers – focus on long-term value, lead by example and incorporate the responsibilities of market leaders to set a tone of fairness and social responsibility in our actions.

Despite rampant volatility, funds across our platform generally performed better than we anticipated at the onset of the pandemic. Within our Liquid funds, our bank loan accounts and CLOs performed particularly well. Defaults remained low and our portfolio managers pivoted from protecting capital during the eye of the storm earlier in the year to slowly adding risk back as the reopening picture emerged. In our multi-asset credit funds, we rotated into bonds barbelled with less liquid securities and structured credit. While this sacrificed a marginal amount of short-term return, we believe we have assembled a strong mix of assets in these funds that should produce attractive returns over the next two to three years.

Our Private Credit business provided the biggest positive surprise during the year. With approximately 200 loans to middle market companies in the US, Europe and Australia going into April, we were concerned
about the pandemic’s short- and long-term impact. How much capital would these companies need? We believed we had a solid portfolio, safer and more senior than most, where nearly 90% of our senior loans had covenants. While the second quarter was marked by borrowers drawing over 80% of their revolving credit facilities, up from 50% in 2008, as I write this all have returned to “normal” pre-March levels.¹ Revolver requests were processed seamlessly and the borrowers have largely repaid them. More importantly, of the ~200 senior and junior private investments outstanding, only 28 of them needed amendments of any kind and only two of them underwent a restructuring due to COVID-19.² The low default rate and ample liquidity of our borrowers demonstrated the benefits of private lending during market dislocations. Individually structured loans, generally with a single lender or a small group of like-minded lenders, withstood the downdraft because they had capital structures built for the long run with loans held by steady hands.

Our Distressed and Special Situations business saw its busiest year ever. Having completed the first close of Distressed & Special Situations 2019, our new global special situations fund, and with plenty of capacity in our two regional funds, Special Situations Asia and Special Situations Europe, we had ample capital to pursue the plethora of opportunities that presented themselves across the globe. For the year, we deployed and committed $2.5B across $1.5B private opportunities and another $1B in public markets.³ Our most notable and visible investment involved the restructuring of Australia’s second largest airline, Virgin Australia, with our Global Private Equity team. Dozens of professionals across our firm played a role in this complex transaction, starting with a local Australian team augmented by internal experts in aerospace, aircraft lending, loyalty programs and leadership development. In many ways, this investment demonstrated our differentiated scale and ability to marshal considerable resources against a highly complex transaction, a feat that few others could have managed.

While Virgin was our largest investment, it accounted for only 6% of the capital deployed and committed. Surprisingly, the economic crisis presented fewer traditional distressed opportunities than we would have predicted. As discussed earlier, capital structures in industries outside the eye of the storm generally held up. We found three overriding themes:

1) Eye of the storm industries, even in the absence of full restructurings, needed capital.
2) European banks, particularly in Southern Europe, were early in selling marginal assets.
3) Bespoke capital solutions, ranging from minority interests to rescue financings to individual asset purchases, presented themselves in unprecedented numbers.

Beyond traditional restructurings like Virgin Australia and Pizza Express in Europe, we bought NPLs in Cyprus and Romania, backstopped a rights offering for a travel agency in Australia, purchased distressed real estate in New York and London, completed a sale/lease back on two 787 aircraft and provided growth capital to a technology center in China, just to name a few. Our footprint of over 20 offices around the globe enabled a robust deal funnel and the capacity to evaluate the wide array of potential investments we unearthed.

¹ Data as of December 31, 2020. Refers to utilization across all Bain Capital Credit direct lending funds.
² Data as of December 31, 2020. Amendments exclude technical amendments. Refers to investments across all Bain Capital Credit private credit investments.
³ Dollars deployed from March 11, 2020 through December 31, 2020. Refers to investments and commitments across Bain Capital Distressed and Special Situations 2019, Bain Capital Special Situations Asia and Bain Capital Special Situations Europe platforms.
Before going into our outlook I wanted to highlight a decision-making framework we use to evaluate complex and fast changing situations. It was created by a US Air Force fighter pilot turned military strategist as he was explaining how to win an aerial dogfight. It is now taught in business schools and used by strategists in the business and political worlds. Called the OODA ("Observe, Orient, Decide, Act") Loop, it emphasizes the perpetual nature of good analysis and decision-making.

**Observe:** The first thing one must do to evaluate any complicated situation is to take a moment and observe. Whether that's a pilot observing her surroundings, a professional athlete observing the opposing team, or investment professionals observing unforeseen changes in markets, the first critical step is observation. Our firm was in observation mode during the early part of 2020. We collectively leveraged the insights from all our business units and 20+ offices across the globe. We continuously monitored the spread of the virus, as well as ran specific company and macroeconomic analyses of potential impacts.

**Orient:** After recognizing the far-reaching impacts the virus would have, we leveraged Bain Capital’s full platform of nine businesses across four continents, insights into hundreds of portfolio companies across numerous industries, trading desks and vertical experts to analyze mitigants. We also pulled together two cross-platform working groups – a COVID-19 evaluation team led by our Life Sciences business and a macro team comprised of business unit and geographic leaders from across the firm. The insights developed by individual businesses and the cross-platform activities were captured and shared across the firm via our proprietary technology-enabled database known as the Bain Capital Collaboration Hub.

**Decide:** The decisional challenge facing all of our businesses was whether to go on offense, defense or maintain a neutral posture. Often, we had to do some of each. By May, we had participated in over 100,000 Zoom meetings across the firm and several hundred investment committee meetings to refine our strategy and approach.

**Act:** Decisions without actions are merely observations. Once we determined a framework for evaluating both COVID impacts and the financial stability of companies across the firm, we invested over $5B in 99 new deals across private markets businesses. We deployed and committed over $2.5B dollars in distressed and special situations investments, made over $1.4B of private loans, amended 28 credit documents, priced five new CLOs and traded over $5B of securities in our liquid accounts.

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4 Past performance is not indicative of future results. Actual results may vary. Data is for full year 2020 unless otherwise noted. Distressed and Special Situations dollars invested from March 11, 2020 through December 31, 2020. Private Credit amendment data is January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020.
Utilizing this approach, we had one of the most productive years in the history of the firm and believe we are positioned for further success for years to come. But it is important to recognize the OODA Loop is called a loop for a reason. You do not follow it just once. We went through the process and the cycle many times during the year and are evaluating new realities as we look forward to recovery and reopening. While we are optimistic that the world will mostly be better by this time next year, we are still studying the enduring impacts on companies, industries, consumer psyche and individual households as a result of the events of the last year.

The following chart is a good example of how we cycled through the OODA Loop. It outlines bond returns rated by potential COVID impacts and was a key framework we began using early in the market dislocation. The green line shows performance of highly rated companies with relatively low COVID impacts, such as cable and software. The yellow line shows performance of moderately impacted companies and industries, such as financials and industrials. Finally, the red line shows the returns of the companies in the eye of the storm – airlines, travel, retail, gaming and others in difficult financial shape to start.

Not surprisingly, the greens were less impacted and recovered first, followed by the yellows. Today, with confidence in the vaccine, there is almost no difference between the green and the yellow lines. However, it is important to note that the red line consistently lagged throughout the year and only recently has begun to regress to tighter spreads relative to the yellow and green lines. That said, these companies still have produced negative returns for the last year and have significant upside should a true recovery and reopening occur during the next six months.

Quantifying the permanent impacts on companies in the red line is where we are spending most of our time. We fear too many people view recovery as binary – things will either be shut down or everything will reopen and be back to the way it was. We have deployed significant analytical resources to understand the shape of that rebound. One such analysis we conducted is a survey of movie theater patrons summarized in the following chart.

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We asked: Assuming movie theaters re-open with strict safety and social distancing measures, how long will it take you to return?6

Measured by individual, 50% of people say that they will not go back to movies for six months or more after a vaccine is developed. But when weighted by dollars spent on movies and one's propensity to go to the movies before the pandemic, the data suggests that about 90% of people will return within six months. On the one hand that's good news – we see a base level of support for this bellwether industry. On the other hand, 90% recovery across a wide swath of consumer businesses will not be good news for the economy or those businesses. To illustrate this, if New York City comes back only to 90% of where it was prior to the pandemic, that will be problematic for its economy.

Of course, the details behind modeling the recovery are far more nuanced than this single analysis, but it does highlight some important considerations. There certainly will be pent-up demand which will level off into a new normal. Some businesses will successfully reinvent themselves. That said, we are concerned it is far too early to project when we fully get out of the woods or expect the vaccine to fix all consumer problems. We will continue to observe, orient, decide and act as more data presents itself.

Looking ahead, there are several important questions we must face: What does a post-COVID economy look like? How much permanent damage has been done to the hardest hit industries and Main Street businesses? Is there a new role for government in providing a stronger safety net as well as new guardrails in some markets and industries? And, perhaps the biggest question, does the social contract that forms the backbone of our economy and open markets need rethinking in light of growing income inequality, uneven impacts of the pandemic, and long ignored barriers to mobility?

Before we dive into the specifics, it is important to return to the GameStop story with which we started, expanding our lens to include Reddit, Robinhood and the general “gamification” of markets. At its core, a group of individual investors came together to buy shares in a mall-based retailer. They used an investment

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6 Source: Bain Capital Credit Movie Theater Survey, May 2020 through Dynata Research (sample size = 1,600).
platform built for small investors and designed to democratize investing. Like subprime mortgages, the original idea was a good one. Just as increased home ownership is a virtuous goal, so is extending stock ownership to small investors. Ownership of assets, whether a home or a stock, is one of the best ways to accumulate long-term wealth. When this admirable goal of democratizing asset ownership transforms into speculation, or worse, gaming or gambling, trouble ensues. With GameStop, some investors hopped on board to create a short squeeze, while others saw it as a game complete with its own lingo like “stonks,” “diamond hands” and “tendies.” The broader issue was small investors wanting to send a message about a market they felt was rigged in favor of big investors. The saddest part of the end result was a stock that raced up hundreds of points and then unceremoniously dropped, costing small investors billions.

These recent events remind us of the fragility of the markets and the need for a greater focus on how we can and will recover from the past 12 months. There are not a lot of instructive parallels we can examine to paint a picture of what the next five to ten years will look like. We have meticulously analyzed prior recessions. We have examined recoveries from previous pandemics. The closest is the Spanish flu outbreak of 1918 and 1919. The world was less global and the economy was much simpler, but nonetheless the impacts were quite severe. Many reference the “Roaring 20s” during which the economy grew by over 40% and assume our recovery will look similar.  This grossly oversimplifies a more complex reality. There was a big bounce back in 1920 as the economy reopened and World War I ended, but that was quickly followed by a recession. Too many people came back from the war looking for jobs and once the pent-up demand from the pandemic passed, the economy was not able to deliver more consistent growth. We also know how the story of the 20s ended.

Today, we believe the consensus is correct that there will be significant bounce back once the vaccine is widely distributed. What we have yet to fully understand is how our lives and the way we operate our businesses will permanently change. If Zoom replaces two or three business trips a year, conferences increasingly become virtual and restaurants permanently need to de-densify, the sustainability of industries that employ millions of people will come into question. Furthermore, drawing parallels from the adoption of Zoom, remote learning, telemedicine and other technology-enabled changes to our lifestyles over the last year, one might draw a new long-term view of the adoption of electric vehicles, driverless cars, robots and other advanced technologies. We do not believe that the world is suddenly going to turn into a version of The Jetsons, but we do recognize underestimating change will be perilous to investors. That is why we are building our own models industry by industry, incorporating demand views coupled with the most difficult technique needed for successful investing in rapidly changing markets – imagination.

Questions of permanent damage done to the economy are critical to answer. The answers are most dependent on an effective and functioning series of government policies coming out of Washington and other world capitals. The movie theater analysis I described earlier can be replicated for independent restaurants, concerts, airlines, hotels and perhaps even some forms of educational institutions. Government policy is going to play a key role in determining how quickly and sustainably the economy recovers as well as how inflation affects the macro outlook. While there are obvious concerns about inflation creeping into (and possibly overwhelming) the system because of the large stimulus as well as massive debt issuance, we are more concerned about whether the government’s efforts provide adequate stimulus. While we have reservations about the rising debt levels in the United States, we are more concerned about the possibility of a permanent “stall” mode where the recovery never quite gets the momentum it needs to sustain and retrench to previous highs. The K-shaped impacts of the last year certainly add to the degree of difficulty, because as the chart below shows, there is wide variance as to the impact by industry and the even wider variation on the level of recovery. This results in demographic, geographic and industry-specific dispersion.

Source: California State University Northridge. “Modern Economy 1919-1930.”
Despite the disparate performance observed across industries, in the market today the spread between CCCs and Bs (a simple measure of how steep the credit curve is, or how much investors are compensated for moving out the risk spectrum) is about as low as it’s ever been (1st percentile). Importantly, this is a measure in aggregate, not a reflection of each individual security or company in the market. Nonetheless, this shows a remarkable complacency few of us would have imagined possible 11 months ago.

Taken as a whole, we should be willing to risk overshooting rather than undershooting growth targets. With ten million unemployed, six million working part time in search of full-time work and four million who have dropped out of the workforce entirely, there is much to be done.

Government intervention in the form of stimulus checks, infrastructure investing and aid to cities and states will all be part of the solution. Historically, minimum wage increases have had a stimulative effect and target those most in need. Certainly, the sum of stimulative actions and the release of pent-up demand upon successful reopening will result in higher input costs and prices for various segments of the economy (as we are already observing in lumber prices, for example), however the K-shaped recovery we noted above is just as relevant in the conversation of inflation and the ultimate path of the broader economy. With rates at historic lows, we believe the Fed has plenty of levers to tap the brakes if needed. We are in an environment of conflicting undercurrents, despite the broad positive fundamental and technical factors in play. Once again, we are looking at this through the lenses of a generation for whom inflation has been a myth from years ago. We will be vigilant in assessing and reassessing inflation as the data present themselves.

Finally, coming off a year of unprecedented social unrest, we have seen several important warning signals that many feel the system is not working for them. I recently had the opportunity to discuss many of these issues, as well as the state of the markets, with Scarlet Fu on Bloomberg. The conversation we had is similar to conversations many of us are having about the state of the world and our role in how we build a better future for our children and grandchildren. This is what drives many of us in this work and why we must do more to get this right. If you’d like to view the interview, please click on this link.

President Biden told the country and the world in his brief but poignant remarks at the COVID memorial on the eve of his inauguration, “To heal, we must remember.” If there is a lesson from 2020, that is it. We must remember the racial oppression that resulted in the awakening of a new civil rights movement. We must remember how interconnected the world is, as demonstrated by a global pandemic that touched every corner of the world. We must remember what happened when democracy was challenged and taken for

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9 Data as of June 30, 2020. Source: Bain Capital Credit analysis and Cleveland Research. Graph shows the same store growth rate averaged across Domino’s (US franchises), Pizza Hut (US branches) and Papa John’s (North America franchises).
10 Data as of February 2020. Source: Bain Capital Credit analysis.
granted. In remembering, we will heal and we will have a more just society, fairer economy and more reliable markets.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Lavine
Co-Managing Partner, Bain Capital, LP
CIO & Founder, Bain Capital Credit, LP
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